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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaint iff/Respondent,

:

v.

Case No. 20616

DEREK ANDREASON,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction for the offense
of Theft, a third degree

felony, in violation of Title 76,

Chapter 6, Section 404> ej: seq, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended, in the Sixth Judicial District Court in and for Sevier
County, State

of

Utah, the Honorable
\JC

presiding.

J Q> *~ (& ~

Don

V. Tibbs, Judge

4&S

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant was charged by Information with the offense
of Theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Annotated, §76-6-404, et_ seq (1953 as amended).

The case was

tried to a jury on March 18, 19, and 20, 1985.

Appellant was

convicted of the offense of Theft, a third degree felony, an
included offense to that charged in the Information.
19, 1985, appellant

was

ordered

to

serve

an

On April

indeterminate

sentence of not more than five years in the Utah State Prison.
That sentence was suspended and appellant was placed on probation.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an order from this court reversing

(

the judgment and conviction rendered against him, and remanding
the case to the Third District Court for a new trial or in the
alternative issue an order to enter a judgment acquitting the
appellant or entering

a

judgment against

appellant

I

for the

lesser offense of Theft, a class B misdemeanor.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues raised in this case are:

(1) Was appellant

denied his right to effective assistance of counsel because the
i

same defense attorney represented both appellant and co-defendant
as well?;

(2) Did the prosecutor's improper closing argument

deny the appellant a fair trial?;

and (3) Was the evidence

sufficient to sustain a conviction for a third degree felony?
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant and his father, Ray Andreason, were jointly
charged, as co-defendants, with theft of services.

(R. 1) The

service involved

appellant's

allegedly

was

electricity

for

outdoor lights and warehouse at his place of business.
72-73)

(Tr.

i

^

The State's theory on the involvement of appellant's

father was that his seal appeared on the power meters that were
bypassed.

(Tr. 74-75)

At trial, both were represented by the

I

same counsel (R. 8) and appellant was convicted of the lesser
offense, a third degree felony (R. 68) while his co-defendant
was found not guilty (R. 69).
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The evidence

presented

at

trial

showed

that, on

September 4, 1984, Larry Mills, an employee of Utah Power and
Light, was investigating a complaint for an over billing at D
and D Construction, appellant's business.

(Tr. 78)

Mr. Mills

noticed a man using an electrical tool inside a warehouse on
the property and the electrical meter to that building did not
appear to have been properly installed.

(Tr. 79)

After remov-

ing the meter he found that it had been bypassed by hooking
jumper cables to the wires going into the meter box.

(Tr. 80)

He then noticed that the cables went through a hole and into
the building.

(Tr. 81)

After unhooking the cables he entered

the building and found that the cables were hooked to a network
of wires by means of a connector not customarily used for that
purpose.

(Tr. 84-85)

Mr. Mills then looked through the ware-

house to determine what types of appliances were present and
which ones

appeared

to have

been

recently

used.

(Tr. 86)

During the course of the investigation Mr. Mills was told by
appellant's father that the source of power for the warehouse
was from extension cords running from the other building.

(Tr.

88)
The following

day

Mr.

Mills

returned

to

conduct

further investigation by opening the meters on the second or
"dairy barn" building.

(Tr. 90) He found one meter was properly

installed and that the other involved a bypass which would allow
electricity to be used without it being registered on the meter.
(Tr. 90) Mills was told that the line on the meter that involved
a bypass went to exterior, or area lights.

(Tr. 93)

Based on

Digitized by the Howard
Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School,
those observations
andW. Hunter
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Power and Light estimated that appellant had received $2,899.45
worth of power that was not paid for.
At no time during the

(Tr. 250)

I

investigation did Mr. Mills

conduct tests to determine if there was in fact power going to
the warehouse from the improper hook ups.

{

No tests were made

on any of the eguipment to determine if it was, in fact, operable.

(Tr. 136) Nor were any employees interviewed to determine
i

the extent of the use of the equipment.
Employees of

D.

and

D.

Construction,

appellant's

company, testified that all of the power used in the warehouse
came from either the "dairy barn" building or from a pole that

-

i

was wired to that building because the outlets in the warehouse
did not work.

(Tr. 346-347, 355, 365, 372, 377, 383)

Those em-

ployees also indicated that most of the equipment in the warehouse
was in need of repair and would not work.

i

(Tr. 350, 387)

With respect to the exterior lights, Reed Burrows, an
employee of

the

power

company, testified

that

the

billing

I

practices of Utah Power and Light was to charge a set rate for
such lights.

(Tr. 304)

A portion of an employee manual for

Utah Power and Light indicated that an electrical hook up as

I

was used for these lights was proper under circumstances similar
to those that existed in this case.

(Tr. 536-537)

The State attempted to show that appellant's father

I

was involved because a "stamp" that had been assigned to him
had been used to place a seal on the wire securing meter.
152-154)

(Tr.

Others who had subsequently been assigned the same

stamp, testified that they had never done work on the meters
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in question and had never used those stamps at the appellant's
place of business.

(Tr. 163, 165)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The respective arguments in this brief are as follows:
The first point raises the issue of prosecutorial misconduct.
The prosecutor, in his closing argument, argued that if appellant
was not convicted others would be encouraged to commit thefts.
These remarks called attention to matters which jurors would
not be justified

in considering.

Further, appellant submits

that these remarks probably influenced the jury's verdict.
The second point raises the issue of the denial of
appellant's right to effective assistance of counsel.
defense attorney
at trial.

represented

appellant

and his

During his testimony, appellant's

The same

co-defendant

father made a

statement placing the blame for the offense on appellant and
exonerating himself.

This was an actual conflict of interest

resulting in a denial of appellant's right to counsel.
The third point raises two related issues regarding
the insufficiency of the evidence.
failure to prove

that

the

The first is based on a

appellant

obtained

or exercised

control over the property of Utah Power and Light.

The second

issue submits the State failed to prove the value of the services
if the services were unlawfully obtained.

Such failure would

thus, as a matter of law, require imposition of judgment for a
class B misdemeanor.
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POINT I

jury that

IN HIS CLOSING ARGUMENT THE PROSECUTOR IMPROPERLY CALLED THE JUROR'S ATTENTION TO
MATTERS THEY WOULD NOT BE JUSTIFIED IN
CONSIDERING WHICH PROBABLY INFLUENCED THEIR
VERDICT.

j

During his closing argument, the prosecutor told the

<

they had

an obligation

otherwise others would
offenses.

be

(Tr. 588-590)

to convict

inclined

to try

The

argument

and

the

to commit

similar

Defense counsel did object, but that

objection was overruled by the trial court.1

1.

the defendants,

objection

i

(Tr. 589)

involved

the

following:

4

Now, if these two gentlemen were our only concern, we
could probably let them go but they're not. Ladies and gentlemen,
we have a concern for all of society, we have concerns if this
goes on and that this is not an isolated incident. This type
of conduct is pervasive and when we're —

i

Mr. Mower:
I object.
I think the prosecutor is
trying to paint the picture that there are others who are not
charged and who are not before the Court.
The Court:

Objection's overruled.

This is argument,

|

Counsel.
Mr. Brown: Perhaps the Defense would have you believe
that nobody else is doing it but they are and everytime we have
a jury trial, people are watching. People are watching to see
how we administer justice and so, before you determine that
there is some reasonable doubt —
and I'm not sure what it is
— but before you determine that, you need to consider that
we're not — we've heard a lot about these two Defendants but
they are not the only ones here and they are not the only ones
we need to be concerned about. We've got to be concerned about
the law.
Now, we give the Defendants a lot of rights to insure
that we never convict an innocent man but while we're insuring
that, we need to be concerned about how many who aren't innocent
are turned loose and how it affects them and us but also how it
affects other, others who are going to base their decisions on
conduct and what they know about how our system works. (T. 588590)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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I

i

i

In State v. Valdez, 30 Ut.2d 54, 513 P.2d 422 (1973) ,
this court described the two pronged test to be applied to a
claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on the improper argument
of counsel:
Counsel for both sides have considerable
latitude in their arguments to the jury;
they have a right to discuss fully from
their standpoints the evidence and the inferences and deductions arising therefrom.
The test of whether the remarks made by
counsel are so objectionable as to merit a
reversal in a criminal case is, did the
remarks call to the attention of the jurors
matters which they would not be justified
in considering in determining their verdict,
and were they, under the circumstances of
the particular case, probably influenced by
those remarks. 513 P.2d at 426.
This test was followed in State v. Crevitson, 646 P.2d
750 (Utah, 1982), State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48 (Ut. 1983) and
State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106 (Ut. 1985).
supra, the prosecutor

argued that

In State v. Crevitson,

if the defendant

received

money from a narcotics transaction even if he was not present
where the transaction occured, he was still guilty.

This court

found that to be a legitimate response to an issue raised by
defense counsel. The court also went on to find that a reference
to the drug problem in the community in argument was simply a
manner of calling the jury's attention to the serious nature of
the offense.
In State v. Johnson, supra, the court found the
evidence was insufficient to establish the offense of theft by
deception in that the element of a loss of an object of value
has not

been

established.

The

court

also

found

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that the

prosecutor had made several improper arguments.

The court gave

the following description of those improprieties:
During closing argument, the prosecutor
referred to William's apparent receipt of
income from Hillhaven while receiving social
security benefits as "double dipping." The
prosecutor continued to state: "as far as
I am concerned white collar crimes like
this is a cancer on society." Furthermore,
the prosecutor referred to Patricia's and
William's signing of Daniel's Hillhaven
paychecks and depositing them in their personal bank accounts as "forging of signatures." Moreover, the prosecutor made
reference to Patricia's and William's filing
for bankruptcy as an indication of dishonesty. The prosecutor stated that it
"[d]escribes the type of person that we are
dealing with." 663 P.2d at 51.

\

I

i

i

The court, stating that there "was no doubt that the prosecutor's
remarks called to the juror's attention matters they would not
be justified in considering", held that these remarks in and

i

of themselves would have required reversal had the court not
already reversed on other grounds.

(_id. at 51)

In State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Ut. 1983), the defense

t

was that the defendant had no motive to commit the arson with
which he was charged. The prosecutor responded to that defense in
closing argument.

The court described that argument, stating:

In closing arguments, the prosecutor commented on the lack-of-motive defense. "Whether he's rational in his business dealings,
you don't have to presume at all. And we
know that criminals have all kinds of
irrational bahavior."
Objection was made
and sustained.
The prosecutor continued,
"You know people do things for odd reasons.
Hinckley is a classic example." Objection
was again made and sustained. 688 P.2d at
485.
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

^

•

*

The court found that the prosecutor's comments requesting a
jury to consider matters outside of the evidence to be misconduct*
The court did elaborate on the second prong of the test previously
stated in Valdez, supra,
"If proof of defendant's guilt is strong,
the challenged conduct or remark will not
be presumed prejudicial." State v. Seegerf
4 Or.App. 336, 479 P.2d 240 (1971). Likewise, in a case with less compelling proof,
this Court will more closely scrutinize the
conduct. If the conclusion of the jurors
is based on their weighing conflicting evidence or evidence susceptible of differing
interpretations, there is a greater likelihood that they will be improperly influenced
through remarks of counsel.
Indeed, in
such cases, the jurors may be searching for
guidance in weighing and interpreting the
evidence. They may be especially susceptible to influence, and a small degree of
influence may be sufficient to affect the
verdict. Counsel is obligated in such cases
to avoid, as far as possible, any reference
to those matters the jury is not justified
in considering. 688 P.2d at 486-487.
Most recently, in State v. Smith, supra, the prosecutor made the following argument:
It is very difficult and we're fortunate
here today, ladies and gentlemen, that [the
victim] did report it because, if we're
ever going to get hold of this, we're all
going to have to do our job, including
juries, and it is not an easy job but it's
got to be done because so many are not
reported because of the difficulties. So
concern yourselves with that when you go in
there. It's not Curtis Ray Smith that's on
trial alone. It's our way of life, you and
I, and how the public is going to percieve
how the criminal law does its job. Do we go
so far in determining that we don't punish
an innocent man that we let too many guilty
ones go or do we look at the cold hard facts
and, even though the hammer of justice is
about to fall, do our jobs, because, ladies
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and gentlemen, if we don't, we know what the
result is going to be,
[Emphasis by the
court] 700 P.2d at 112.
The court found that this type of argument was "clearly improper"
as it suggested that "the jury had some obligation beyond the
determination of guilt or innocence of the defendant solely on
the basis of evidence introduced at trial".

700 P.2d at 1112.

The court held that the evidence of the defendant's guilt was
substantial as it "..was not a case where the evidence presented
a close question or offered several possible constructions of
ambiguous evidence".

700 P.2d at 1113.

In the instant case, the prosecutor argued that if the
jurors did not convict the defendants they would be encouraging
others to commit this sort of theft.

This argument is indistin-

guishable from that made in State v. Smith, supra.2
as in Johnson and Troy

Likewise,

the prosecutor directed the jurors'

attention to similar matters outside of the evidence.

As for

the second prong of the Valdez test, the evidence in this case
was "close" and its ambiguities were subject to several interpretations.

Although there was testimony that the method of

installing the power meters was improper (Tr. 79, 90), other
evidence indicated that there was no power bypass on the meter
for the warehouse.
second meter,
authorized.

2.

(Tr. 90) With respect to the hookup of the

evidence

suggested

that

the

arrangement

was

(Tr. 536, 537) Due to these questions and conflicts

The same attorney prosecuted this case and the Smith case.
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that were present in the evidencef appellant submits that the
jury was probably influenced by the improper remarks made by
the prosecutor.
POINT II
BECAUSE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL'S JOINT REPRESENTATION OF APPELLANT AND HIS CO-DEFENDANT,
WITH WHOM HE HAD AN ACTUAL CONFLICT OF
INTEREST, APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
In Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475

(1978), the

United States Supreme Court held that if an attorney represents
multiple criminal

defendants

at

trial

who

have

conflicting

interests, they are denied their right to the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment as applied
to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.

In that case, a single attorney had been appointed

to represent co-defendants in a robbery and rape case.

The

attorney made timely motions to withdraw from one of the cases
and to have separate counsel appointed.

He alleged that there

was a conflict of interest between the two defendants, but did
not elaborate on the nature of the conflict. All of his motions
to withdraw were denied.

The Court then held that when the

right to counsel has been denied, prejudice will be presumed
and the conviction reversed automatically.

Citing the cases of

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1976) and Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963), the Court reasoned:
...this Court has concluded that
tance of counsel is among those
tional rights so basic to a fair
their infraction can never be

the assis'constitutrial that
treated as
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harmless error.1 [Citations omitted]. Accordingly, when a defendant is deprived of
the presence and assistance of his attorney,
either throughout the prosecution or during
a critical stage in, at least, the prosecution of a capital offense, reversal is automatic. [Citations omitted].
That an attorney representing multiple defendants with conflicting interests is
physically present at pretrial proceedings,
during trial, and at sentencing does not
warrant departure of conflicting interests
is suspect because of what it tends to
prevent the attorney from doing. 435 U.S.
at 489-490.
Because of the problems inherent in determining when an attorney
failed to act and assessing the effect on the jury verdict, the
Court held that prejudice need not be shown.

In explaining

,

<

i

this, the Court stated:
...a rule requiring a defendant to show
that a conflict of interests
which he
and his counsel tried to avoid by timely
objections to the joint representation
prejudiced him in some specific fashion
would not be susceptibel of intelligent, *
evenhanded application. In the normal case
where a harmless-error rule is applied, the
error occurs at trial and its scope is
readily identifiable. Accordingly, the reviewing court can undertake with some confidence its relatively narrow task of assessing the likelihood that the error materially affected the deliberations of the
jury. [Citations omitted].
But in the
case of joint representation of conflicting
interests the evil
it bears repeating
is in what the advocate finds himself
compelled to refrain from doing, not only
at trial but also as to possible pretrial
plea negotiations and in the sentencing
process. [Emphasis by the Court].
435
U.S. at 490-491.
Subsequently, in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S.

(

<

4

I

335
i

(1980), the Court ruled that the possibility of a conflict of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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interest is insufficient to require reversal of a case when an
attorney jointly represents co-defendants.

In that case the

defendant accepted the services of an attorney whom his codefendant had retained. The two were tried separately, and neither counsel nor the Court raised the issue of a conflict of
interest.

The Court noted that unless defense counsel raised

the issue of a conflict of interest the trial court need not
make inquiries in a case involving joint representation unless
the circumstances are such that the court knows or reasonably
should know of the conflict.
Although this

is

the

constitutional

standard, the

Supreme Court has imposed a much higher standard on the federal
courts.

Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

deals with

the defendant's

right to counsel.

Rule 44(c) states:

Specifically,

"'•'*"'

(c) Joint representation. Whenever two or
more defendants have been jointly charged
pursuant to Rule 8(b) or have been joined
for trial pursuant to Rule 13 f and are
represented by the same retained or assigned
counsel who are associated in the practice
of law, the court shall promptly inquire
with respect to such joint representation
and shall personally advise each defendant
of his right to the effective assistance of
counsel, including separate representation.
Unless it appears that there is good cause
to believe no conflict of interest is likely
to arise, the court shall take such measures
as may be appropriate to protect each defendant's right to counsel.
The notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules indicates
that the primary purpose for enacting this rule was to prevent
post-conviction claims

that

joint

representation
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had denied

criminal defendant's of their Sixth Amendment right the effective
assistance of counsel.3
It is clear

that the Utah cases follow the Sixth

Amendment rulings with respect to conflicts of interest when
co-defendants are jointly represented by a single attorney or a
single law

firm.

In State v. Tippetts, 584 P.2d

1978)f co-defendants in an aggravated

robbery

892 (Ut.f

case were re-

presented by the same public defender at both trial and preliminary hearing.

Prior to trial, the attorney represented to

the court that there were no conflicts of interest and the
defendants agreed to the joint representation.

In upholding

the conviction and judgment the court stated:
[T]here is nothing in the record to indicate
that the dual representation of Lopez and
Tippetts during the preliminary hearing and
at the trial in any way prejudiced the defense of the appellant. 584 P.2d at 893.
However, in State v. Smith, 621 P.2d 697 (Ut., 1920),
the same public defender office represented co-defendants charged
with arson

and

burglary.

One

of

the

defendants

testified

against the appellant in exchange for a reduction in charges. The
State argued that the conflict of interest issue was not raised
in the trial court.

In rejecting that argument the court found

that the existence of such a conflict was clear in the record.
This was because, in advising one client to testify against the
second client, the attorney was not effectively assisting the

3. The text of the Notes of the Advisory Committee are set out
in full in the Addendum.
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second client in that he was not identifying with that client's
interest.

The court went on to hold that because the defendant

was denied

the fundamental

right

of assistance

of counsel,

there was no need to show prejudice.
In that case this court declined to adopt a rule requiring separate counsel for co-defendants in every case in
Utah.

Although such a rule may not be necessary, this court

should require trial courts to make an inquiry similar to that
required by Rule 44(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The reasons for the adaption of Rule 44(c) are described in the
Notes of the Advisory Committee which are set out in the Addendum
Essentially, the Advisory Committee felt that such a rule was
necessary to protect the defendant's right to counsel, and also
prevent post-conviction

challenges to criminal judgments.

A

requirement for an inquiry by the trial court also gives judges
enough latitude to either require separate counsel or allow a
defendant to make an informed waiver of a potential conflict of
interest.
The issues that arise from the joint representation
in this case are:

(1) Did the trial court know or should it

have known of a conflict requiring the appellant to be warned
by the trial court?

(2) Was there an actual conflict?

With respect to the first issue, prior to trial there
was little to indicate an actual conflict of interest.

The

defendants were jointly charged, (R. 1) and they were represented
by the same counsel.

(R. 8)

The only thing that indicated an

actual conflict was that different defenses may be applicable,
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was the minute entry from the preliminary hearing indicating
there were

separate motions

co-defendants.

for dismissal

for each

of the

(R. 17)

During the trial itselff the judge should have become
reasonably aware of the conflict. On cross examination, the codefendant, appellant's father was asked about his reaction to
discovery of the bypass of the meter:
Q: You'd never seen that cable sticking
out of there?

*

A: No, sir, I had never seen that cable.
I was really surprised when I seen that
cable.
i

,,,:.-.,,'•.

Q: I assume, Mr. Andreason, that you saw
this concoction of materials?
(Witness looks at exhibit).
A: Yes, sir, that's where I saw the ends
that had been cut off. I saw the ends that
they had cut off sticking up and that's all
I saw.
Q:

Is that customary electrical practice?

A: Well, not necessarily, but it's —
never thought of it before.
Q:

'

I've

Has is ever been done before?

A: Well, I never thought of it.
have done it myself and I knew it.

I may

'

Q: So, after that and after he told you
that and you expressed your surprise and
then what, then he left?

.

A:

That's right, sir.

Q: Did you have a discussion with Derek
about this?
A: I called him and told him. I told him
I said what I thought and, of course, I'm
not going to make mention of the language I
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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*

used but he didn't know nothing about it.
He was clear out in Vernal.
Q:

It's his building; isn't it?

A: That's right. I don't want to be blamed
for something I haven't done; that's right.
(T. 481-488)
Although appellant's father did not specifically blame
appellant for the situation, the implication in the last answer
is unmistakeable.

At this point, the trial court was obligated

to warn appellant of the problems of his counsel representing
conflicting interests.

Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra.

Since this

warning was not given the appellant was denied his right to
counsel as guaranteed by the Utah State and Federal Constitutions.

Furthermore, since the co-defendant so clearly implicated

him as the culprit in asserting his own innocence, there was an
actual conflict of interest.

The effect is the same as one

defendant getting a reduction in charges in exchange for testimony against a co-defendant, as was the case in State v. Smith,
supra.

Due to the fact that there was an actual conflict of

interest prejudice need not be shown in order to obtain a new
trial.

Holloway v. Arkansas, supra.

Consequently, appellant's

conviction must be remanded to the district court and a new
trial ordered.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE FAILED TO PROVE THAT APPELLANT
OBTAINED OR EXERCISED CONTROL OVER ANOTHER'S
PROPERTY. FURTHER, THE EVIDENCE FAILED ALSO TO PROVE THE VALUE OF SUCH PROPERTY OR
SERVICES ALLEGEDLY OBTAINED.
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The standard by which this court reviews a conviction
to determine if the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction has been described

in a number of cases.

Recently, in

State v. Petreey 659 P.2d 443 (Ut. 1983), the court stated,
In considering that question, we review the
evidence and all inferences which may
reasonably be drawn from it in the light
most favorable to the verdict of the jury.
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so
viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the crime of
which he was convicted. 659 P.2d at 444.
The court then went on to note the evidence must do
more than raise a mere speculation as to the defendant's guilt:
...we deem it desirable to emphasize that
notwithstanding the presumptions in favor
of the jury's decision this Court still has
the right to review the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the verdict. The fabric
of evidence against the defendant must cover
the gap between the presumption of innocence
and the proof of guilt. In fulfillment of
its duty to review the evidence and all
inferences which may reasonably be drawn
from it in the light most favorable to the
verdict, the reviewing court will stretch
the evidentiary fabric as far as it will
go. But this does not mean that the court
can take a speculative leap across a remaining gap in order to sustain a verdict. The
evidence, stretched to it utmost limits,
must be sufficient to prove the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 659 P.2d
at 444-445.
In the instant case, the jury was instructed on the
elements of theft as described in Utah Code Annotated, §76-6404 (1953 as amended) (R. 45-48) and further given a definition
of theft

of

services

as described

in Utah

Code Annotated,
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§76-6-409 (1953 as amended) (R. 59). The elements instructions
include the elements of theftf a second degree felony, (R. 45)
a third degree felony, (R. 46) a class A misdemeanor, (R. 47)
and a class B misdemeanor (R. 48). However, the court failed
to give an instruction defining

"value" to the jury.4

Two

questions result with respect to the issue of the sufficiency
of the evidence: First, did appellant obtain or exercise control
over the property or services of Utah Power and Light. Secondly,
if so, what was the value of such property or services?
A
THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THAT APPELLANT
OBTAINED OR EXERCISED CONTROL OVER THE
PROPERTY OF UTAH POWER AND LIGHT.
In the

instant

case,

the

evidence

unquestionably

showed an improper electrical meter hook up on the warehouse.
(Tr. 79)

However, there was no evidence introduced nor were

any tests actually made, to determine if it was possible to use
electricity in that

building

as

a result

of the hook

up.

Furthermore, employees of appellant's construction company testified that the electricity which was used in the warehouse
building came from a pole or the office
metered.

that was properly

(Tr. 346-347, 355, 365, 372, 377, 383)
With respect to the bypass of the meter to the outdoor

lights, a problem with the original wiring resulting in short

4. It must be conceded that no such instruction was requested,
nor was there an exception made to the failure to give that
instruction (Tr. 549).
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circuits was described.

Also, evidence was introduced to prove

that the wiring on that meter could be proper,
To prove

(Tr. 536-537)

a theft, the evidence must

show beyond

reasonable doubt that appellant obtained or exercised
over the electricity

a

control

in question, Utah Code Annotated, §76-6-

404 (1953 as amended).

<

Specifically, the claim here was that

of theft of services which requires a showing that the electricity
was actually diverted for appellant's own benefit or the benefit
of another.

.-*

Utah Code Annotated, §76-6-409(2) (1953 as amend-

ed).
In People v. McLaughlin, 402 NYS2d
the court discussed

the nature of

the

137 (N.Y. 1978),

theft of

(

electricity,

stating:
We have already indicated that the cases
agree unanimously that electricity is a
commodity which may be the subject of
larceny, and that an asportation occurs
when there is a tampering with the meter
which has the effect of diverting the
electricity to the gain of the subscriber
at the expense of the supplier. From this
there would seem to follow an imperative
corollary. The moment the electricity is
"asported" in the described manner, the
subscriber is instantaneously in possession
of stolen property, to wit, the wrongfully
asported electricity. [Emphasis by the
court] 402 NYS2d at 143.
Although this

deals

defendant possessed

with
stolen

what

is

required

electricity,

two requirements must be met:

(1)

it

to
is

show

i

i

that

important

a

that

that there was a tampering

with the meter, and; (2) that electricity

was, in fact, di-

verted.
In the instant case, there is only speculation as to
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the claim of an actual diversion.

There was no evidence of any

increase in billings nor any evidence to show that appellant's
rate of

useage

was

significantly

businesses in that area.

lower

than

other

similar

This "speculative leap" is prohibited

by the standards set forth in State v. Petreey supra.

Con-

sequently, appellant's conviction must be reversed and remanded
with an order to the district court to enter a verdict of not
f

guilty.
B

THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THE VALUE OF ANY
ELECTRICAL SERVICES THAT MAY HAVE BEEN
IMPROPERLY USED.
Utah Code Annotated, §76-6-101(4) (1953 as amended)
sets forth criteria for a jury to use in determining the value
of lost or destroyed property.

That statute provides:

"Value" means:
(a) The market value of property, if totally
destroyed, at the time and place of the
offense, or where cost of replacement
exceeds the market value; or
(b) Where the market value cannot be
ascertained, the cost of repairing or
replacing the property within a reasonable
time following the offense.
(c) If the property damaged has a value
that cannot be ascertained by the criteria
set forth in subsections (a) and (b) above,
the property shall be deemed to have a
value not to exceed $50.
The State

introduced

appellant would have paid.

evidence

(Tr. 276-282)

indicating

the

rate

This rate was applied

to machines that were observed in the warehouse.

The amount of

useage of the machines was an assumption based on an average
established by the power company.

(Tr. 284, 300)
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A police

officer testified

that he had occasionally

observed

welding

being performed in those premises and sounds of a power saw.
(Tr. 240, 242)

There was also some evidence such as metal

filings and disturbed dust to indicate a recent useage.

(Tr.

86)
A figure for the amount of power used by such machines
was estimated by Utah Power and Light.

(Tr. 276-282)

However,

Mr. Burrows, who made the estimate, stated that the information
on the actual use of the machinery was unavailable.

(Tr. 311)

Consequently, the use figure was based on a number of assumptions
on his part.

(Tr. 289)

The amount of use attributed to the

outdoor lights was five hundred dollars worth of electricity.
(Tr. 304)

However, the evidence

indicated

that such lights

were intended to be fed off the secondary line without being
metered.

(Tr.

187)

These estimates, without more to substan-

tiate the use of electricity, also fall into the category of
mere speculation.
Consequently, the

value

of

the

service

cannot

be

ascertained and must be deemed to be less than fifty dollars,
Utah Code Annotated, §76-6-101(4)(c) (1953 as amended).

The

judgment and conviction must be reversed and the case remanded
for entry of a judgment against the appellant for the offense
of theft a class B misdemeanor.
CONCLUSION
Appellant is entitled

to a

new trial due
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to the

prosecutorial misconduct and the denial of his right to the
effective assistance of counsel.

In the alternative, due to

the insufficiency of the evidence, the case should be remanded
to the district court with an order to either dismiss the charge
or reduce the charge to a class B misdemeanor.
Dated this

day of November, 1985.

G. FRED METOS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

V

I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed/delivered to the
Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt
Lake City, Utah, 84114, on this

day of November, 1985.
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ADDENDUM
Constitution of the United States
Amendment VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained
by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defense.
Amendment XIV
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Constitution of Utah
Section 12. [Rights of accused persons]. In criminal
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to
testify in his own behalf, to be- confronted by the witnesses
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance
of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial
by an impartial jury of the country or district in which the
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to
appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person,
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to
secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense.
i
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(Addendum continued)
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended)
76-6-101. Definitions. For purposes of this chapter:
(1) "property" means any form of real property or tangible
personal property which is capable of being damaged or destroyed
and includes a habitable structure.
(2) "Habitable structure" means any building, vehicle, trailer,
railway car, aircraft, or watercraft used for lodging or
assembling persons or conducting business whether a person is
actually present or not.
(3) "Property" is that of another, if anyone other than the
actor has possessory or proprietary interest in any portion
thereof.
(4) "Value" means:
(a) The market value of the property, if totally destroyed, at
the time and place of the offense, or where cost of replacement
exceeds the market value; or
(b) Where the market value cannot be ascertained, the cost of
repairing or replacing the property within a reasonable time
following the offense.
(c) If the property damaged has a value that cannot be ascertained
by the criteria set forth in subsections (a) and (b) above, the
property shall be deemed to have a value not to exceed $50.
76-6-401. Definitions. For the purposes of this
part: (1) "Property" means anything of value, including real
estate, tangible personal property, captured or domestic animals
and birds, written instruments or other writings representing
or embodying rights concerning real or personal property,
labor, services, or otherwise containing anything of value to
the owner, commodities of a public utility nature such as
telecommunications, gas, electricity, steam, or water, and
trade secrets, meaning the whole or any portion of any scientific
or technical information, design, process, procedure, formula
or invention which the owner thereof intends to be available
only to persons selected by him.
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about a
transfer of possession or of some other legally recognized
interest in property, whether to the obtainer or another; in
relation to labor or services, to secure performance thereof;
and in relation to a trade secret, to make any facsimile,
replica, photograph, or other reproduction.
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object:
(a) To withhold property permanently or for so extended a period
or to use under such circumstances that a substantial portion
of its economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would
be lost; or
(b) To restore the property only upon payment of a reward or
other compensation; or
(c) To dispose of the property under circumstances that make it
unlikely that the owner will recover it.
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(Addendum continued)
(§76-6-401. Definitions continued)
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means, but is
not necessarily limited to, conduct heretofore defined or known
as common-law larceny by trespassory taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee, and embezzlement.
76-6-404. Theft - elements. A person commits theft
if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property
of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
76-6-409. Theft of services. (1) A person commits
theft if he obtains services which he knows are available only
for compensation by deception, threat, force, or any other
means designed to avoid the due payment therefor.
(2) A person commits theft if, having control over the
disposition of services of another, to which he knows he is not
entitled, he diverts such services to his own benefit or to the
benefit of another who he knows is not entitled thereto.
(3) As used in this section "services1 includes, but is not
necessarily limited to, labor, professional service, public
utility, and transportation services, restaurant, hotel, motel,
tourist cabin, rooming house, and like accomodations, the
supplying of equipment, tools, vehicles, or trailers for temporary use, telephone or telegraph service, gas, electricity,
water or steam, and the like, admission to entertainment,
exhibitions, sporting events, or other events for which a charge
is made.
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
Rule 44(c)
Joint Representation. Whenever two or more defendants
have been jointly charged pursuant to Rule 8(b) or have been
joined for trial pursuant to Rule 13, and are represented by
the same retained or assigned counsel or by retained or assigned
counsel who are associated in the practice of law, the court
shall promptly inquire with respect to such joint representation
and shall personally advise each defendant of his right to the
effective assistance of counsel, including separate representation. Unless it appears that there is good cause to believe no
conflict of interest is likely to arise, the court shall take
such measures as may be appropriate to protect each defendant's
right to counsel.
Notes of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
Rule 44(c) establishes a procedure for avoiding the
occurrence of events which might otherwise give rise to a
plausible post-conviction calim that because of joint represenDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(Addendum continued)
(Rule 44(c) continued)
tation the defendants in a criminal case were deprived of their
Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.
Although "courts have differed with respect to the scope and
nature of the affirmative duty of the trial judge to assure
that criminal defendants are not deprived of their right to the
effective assistance of counsel by joint representation of
conflicting interests," Holloway v. Arkansas, 98 S.Ct. 1173
(1978) (where the Court found it unnecessary to reach this
issue), this amendment is generally consistent with the current
state of the law in several circuits. As held in United States
v. Carrigan, 543 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1976):
When a potential conflict of interest
arises, either where a court has assigned
the same counsel to represent several
defendants or where the same counsel has
been retained by co-defendants in a criminal
case, the proper course of action for the
trial judge is to conduct a hearing to
determine whether a conflict exists to the
degree that a defendant may be prevented
from receiving advice and assistance
sufficient to afford him the quality of
representation guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment. The defendant should be fully
advised by the trial court of the facts
underlying the potential conflict and be
given the opportunity to express his views.
See also United States v. Lawriw, 568 F.2d 98 (8th
Cir. 197) (duty on trial judge to make inquiry where joint
representation by appointed or retained counsel, and "without
such an inquiry a finding of knowing and intelligent waiver
will seldom, if ever, be sustained by this Court"); Abraham v.
United States, 549 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v.
Mari, 526 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Truglio,
493 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1974) (joint representation should cause
trial judge "to inquire whether the defenses to be presented in
any way conflict"); United States v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d 4988 (2d
Cir. 1973); United States ex rel. Hart v. Davenport, 478 F.2d
203 (3d Cir. 1973) (noting there "is much to be said for the
rule . . . which assumes prejudice and nonwaiver if there has
been no on-the-record inquiry be the court as to the hazards to
defendants from joint representation"); United States v. Alberti,
470 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d
1 (1st Cir. 1972) (lack of sufficient inquiry shifts the burden
of proof on the question of prejudice to the government);
Campbell v. United States, 352 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir, 1965) (where
joint representation, court "has a duty to ascertain whether
each defendant has an awareness of the potential risks of that
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(Addendum continued)
(Rule 44(c) continued)
course and neverthless has knowingly chosen it"). Some states
have taken a like position; see, e.g.f State v. Olsen, Minn.
1977, 258 N.W.2d 898.
This procedure is also consistent with that recommended
in the ABA Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial
Judge (Approved Draft, 1972) which provide in §3.4(b):
Whenever two or more defendants who have
been jointly charged, or whose cases have
been consolidated, are represented by the
same attorney, the trial judge should inquire into potential conflicts which may
jeopardize the right of each defendant to
the fidelity of his counsel.
Avoiding a conflict-of-interest situation is in the
first instance a responsibility of the attorney. If a lawyer
represents "multiple clients having potentially differing interests, he must weigh carefully the possibility that his
judgment may be impaired or his loyalty divided if he accepts
or continues the employment," and his is to "resolve all doubts
against the propriety of the representation." Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Consideration 5-15. See also
ABA Standards Relating to the Defense Function §3.5(b) (Approved
Draft, 1971), concluding that the "potential for conflict of
interest in representing multiple defendants is so grave that
ordinarily a lawyer should decline to act for more than one of
several co-defendants except in unusual situations when, after
careful investigation, it is clear that no conflict is likely
to develop and when the several defendants give an informed
consent to such multiple representation."
It by no means follows that the inquiry provided for
by rule 44(c) is unnecessary. For one thing, even the most
diligent attorney may be unaware of facts giving rise to a
potential conflict. Often "counsel must operate somewhat in
the dark and feel their way uncertainly to an understanding of
what their clients may be called upon to meet upon a trial" and
consequently "are frequently unable to foresee developments
which may require changes in strategy."
United States v.
Carrigan, supra (concurring opinion). "Because the conflicts
are often subtle it is not enough to rely upon counsel, who may
not be totally disinterested, to make sure that each of his
joint clients has made an effective waiver." United States v.
Lawriw, supra.
Moreover, it is important that the trial judge
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(Addendum continued)
(Rule 44(c) continued)
ascertain whether the effective and fair administration of
justice would be adversely affected by continued joint representation, even when an actual conflict is not then apparent.
As noted in United States v. Mariy supra (concurring opinion):
Trial court insistence that, except in
extraordinary circumstances, codefendants
retain separate counsel will in the long
run ... prove salutary not only to the
administration of justice and the appearance
of justice but the cost of justice? habeas
corpus petitions, petitions for new trials,
appeals and occasionally retrials ... can
be avoided. Issues as to whether there is
an actual conflict of interest, whether the
conflict has resulted in prejudice, whether
there has been a waiver, whether the waiver
is intelligent and knowledgeable, for
example, can all be avoided. Where a
conflict that first did not appear subsequently
arises in or before trial, ... continuances
or mistrials can be saved. Essentially by
the time a case ... gets to the appellate
level the harm to the appearance of justice
has already been done, whether or not
reversal occurs; at the trial level it is a
matter which is so easy to avoid.
A rule 44(c) inquiry is required whether counsel is
assigned or retained. It "makes no difference whether counsel
is appointed by the court or selected by the defendants; even
where selected by the defendants the same dangers of potential
conflict exist, and it is also possible that the rights of the
public to the proper administration of justice may be affected
adversely." United States v. Mari, supra (concurring opinion).
See also United States v. Lawriw, supra. When there has been
"no discussion as to possible conflict initiated by the court,"
it cannot be assumed taht the choice of counsel by the defendants
"was intelligently made with knowledge of any possible conflict."
United States v. Carrigan, supra. As for assigned counsel, it
is provided by statute that "the court shall appoint separate
counsel for defendants having interests that cannot properly be
represented by the same counsel, or when other good cause is
shown." 18 U.S.C §3006(A)(b). Rule 44(c) is not intended to
prohibit the automatic appointment of separate counsel in the
first instance, see Ford v. United States, 379 F.2d 123 (D.C.
Cir. 1967), which would obviate the necessity for an inquiry.
Under rule 44(c), an inquiry is called for when the
joined defendants are represented by the same attorney and also
when they are represented by attorneys "associated in the
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(Addendum continued)
(Rule 44(c) continued)
practice of law". This is consistent with Code of Professional
Responsibilty, Disciplinary Rule 5-105(D) (providing that if "a
lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from
employment" because of a potential conflict, "no partner or
associate of his or his firm may accept or continue such
employment"); and ABA Standards Relating to the Defense Function
§3.5(b) (Approved Draft, 1971) (applicable to "a lawyer or
lawyers who are associated in practice"). Attorney representing
joined defendants should so advise the court if they are
associated in the practice of law.
The rule 44(c) procedure is not limited to cases
expected to go to trial. Although the more dramatic conflict
situations, such as when the question arises as to whether the
several defendants should take the stand, Morgan v. United
States, 396 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1968), tend to occur in a trial
context, serious conflicts may aslo arise when one or more of
the jointly represented defendants pleads guilty.
The problem is that even where as here both
co-defendants pleaded guilty there are
frequently potential conflicts of interest
... [T]he prosecutor may be inclined to
accept a guilty plea from one co-defendant
which may harm the interests of the other.
The contrast in the dispositions of the
cases may have a harmful impact on the codefendant who does not initially plead
guilty; he may be pressured into pleading
guilty himself rather than face his codefendant's bargained-for testimony at a
trial. And it will be his own counsel's
recommendation to the initially pleading codefendant which will have contributed to
this harmful impact upon him ... [I]n a
given instance it would be at least
conceivable that the prosecutor would be
willing to accept pleas to lesser offenses
from two defendants in preference to a plea
of guilty by one defendant to a greater
offense.
United States v. Mari, supra (concurring opinion).
To the same effect is ABA Standards Relating to the Defense
Function at 213-14.
It is comtemplated that under rule 44(c) the court
will make appropriate inquiry of the defendants and of counsel
regarding the possibility of a conflict of interest developing.
Whenever it is necessary to make a more particularized inquiry
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into the nature of the contemplated defense, the court should
"pursue the inquiry with defendants and their counsel on the
record but in chambers" so as "to avoid the possibility of
prejudicial disclosures to the prosecution." United States v.
Foster, supra. It is important that each defendant be "fully
advised of the facts underlying the potential conflict and is
given an opportunity to express his or her views." United
States v. Alberti, supra. The rule specifically requires that
the court personally advise each defendant of his right to
effective assistance of counsel, including separate representation. See United States v* Foster, supra, requiring that the
court make a determination that jointly represented defendants
"understand that they may retain separate counsel, or if qualified, may have such counsel appointed by the court and paid for
by the government."
Under rule 44(c), the court is to take appropriate
measures to protect each defendant's right to counsel unless it
appears "there is good cause to believe no conflict of interest
is likely to arise" as a consequence of the continuation of
such joint representation. A less demanding standard wold not
adequately protect the Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel or the effective administration of criminal
justice. Although joint representation "is not per se violative
of constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel,
Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, it would not suffice to require
the court to act only when a conflict of interest if then
apparent, for it is not possible to "anticipate with complete
accuracy the course that a criminal trial may take." Fryar v.
United States, 404 F.2d 1071 (10th Cir. 1968). This is particularly so in light of the fact that if a conflict later arises
and a defendant thereafter raises a Sixth Amendment objection,
a court must grant relief without indulging "in nice calculations
as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial." Glasser
v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942). This is because, as the
Supreme Court more recently noted in Holloway v. Arkansas,
supra, "in a case of joint representation of conflicting interests the evil ... is in what the advocate finds himself
compelled to refrain from doing," and this makes it "virtually
impossible" to assess the impact of the conflict.
Rule 44(c) does not specify what particular measures
must be taken. It is appropriate to leave this within the
court's discretion, for the measures which will best protect
each defendant's right to counsel may well vary from case to
case. One possible course of action is for the court to obtain
a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of the right to
separate representation, for, as noted in Holloway v. Arkansas,
supra, "a defendant may waive his right to the assistance of an
attorney unhindered by a conflict of interests". See United
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States v. DeBerry, supra, holding that defendants should be
jointly represented only if "the court has ascertained that ...
each understands clearly the possibilities of a conflict of
interest and waives any rights in connection with it." It must
be emphasized that a "waiver of the right to separate representation should not be accepted by the court unless the defendants
have each been informed of the probable hazards; and the voluntary
character of their waiver is apparent." ABA Standards Relating
to the Function of the Trial Judge at 45. United States v.
Garcia, supra, spells out in significant detail what should be
done to assure an adequate waiver:
As in Rule 11 procedures, the district
court should address each defendant personally
and forthrightly advise him of the potential
dangers of representation by counsel with a
conflict of interest. The defendant must
be at liberty to question the district
court as to the nature and consequences of
his legal representation. Most significantly,
the court should seek to elicit a narrative
response from each defendant that he has
been advised of his right to effective
representation, that he understands the
details of his attorney's possible conflict
of interest and the potential perils of
such a conflict, that he has discussed the
matter with his attorney or if he wishes
with outside counsel, and that he voluntarily
waives his Sixth Amendment protections. It
is, of course, vital that the waiver be
established by "clear, unequivocal, and
unambiguous language." .. Mere assent in
response to a series of questions from the
bench may in some circumstances constitute
an adequate waiver, but the court should
nonetheless endeavor to have each defendant
personally articulate in detail his intent
to forego this significant constitutional
protection. Recordation of the waiver
colloque between defendant and judge, will
also serve the government's interest by
assisting in shielding any potential
conviction from collateral attack, either
on Sixth Amendment grounds or on a Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendment "fundamental fairness
basis.
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See also Hyman, Joint Representation of Multiple
Defendants in a Criminal Trial: The Court1s Headache, 5 Hofstra
L.Rev.315, 334 (1977).
Another possibility is that the court will order that
the defendants be separately represented in subsequent proceedings
in the case.
Though the court must remain alert to and
take account of the fact that "certain
advantages might accrue from joint
representation," Holloway v. Arkansas,
supra, it need not permit the joint
representation to continue merely because
the defendants express a willingness to so
proceed.
That is, there will be cases
where the court should require separate
counsel to represent certain defendants
despite the expressed wishes of such
defendants. Indeed, failure of the trial
court to require separate representation
may ... require a new trial, even though
the defendants have expressed a desire to
continue with the same counsel. The right
to effective representation by counsel
whose loyalty is undivided is so paramount
in the proper administration of criminal
justice that it must in some cases take
precedence over all other considerations,
including the expressed preference of the
defendants concerned and their attorney.
United States v. Carrigan, supra (concurring opinion).
See also United States v. Lawriw, supra; Abraham v. United
States, supra; ABA Standards Relating to the Defense Function
at 213, concluding that in some circumstances "even full
disclosure and consent of the client may not be an adequate
protection." As noted in United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177
(3d Cir. 1978), such an order may be necessary where the trial
judge is
not satisfied that the waiver is proper.
For example, a defendant may be competent
enough to stand trial, but not competent
enough to understand the complex, subtle,
and sometimes unforeseeable dangers inherent
in multiple representation. More importantly,
the judge may find that the waiver cannot
be intelligently made simply because he is
not in a position to inform the defendant
of the forseeable prejudices multiple
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As concluded in DoLan, "exercise of the court's
supervisory powers by disqualifying an attorney representing
multiple criminal defendants in spite of the defendants' express
desire to retain that attorney does not necessarily abrogate
defendant's sixth amendment rights". It does not follow from
the absolute right of self-representation recognized in Faretta
v, California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), that there is an absolute
right to counsel of one's own choice. Thusf
when a trial court finds an actual conflict
of interest which impairs the ability of a
criminal defendant's chosen counsel to
conform with the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility, the court should not be
required to tolerate an inadequate
representation of a defendant. Such
representation not only constitutes a breach
of professional ethics and invites disrespect
for the integrity of the court, but it is
also detrimental to the independent interest
of the trial judge to be free from future
attacks over the adequacy of the waiver or
the fairness of the proceedings in his own
court and the subtle problems implicating
the defendant's comprehension of the waiver.
Under such circumstances, the court can
elect to exercise its supervisory authority
over members of the bar to enforce the
ethical standard requiring an attorney to
decline multiple representation.
United States v. Dolan, supra. See also Geer, Conflict
of Interest and Multiple Defendants in a Criminal Case:
Professional Responsibilities of the Defense Attorney, 62
Minn.L.Rev. 119 (1978); Note, Conflict of Interests in Multiple
Representation of Criminal Co-Defendants, 68 J.Crim.L. & C. 226
(1977) .
The failure in a particular case to conduct a rule
44(c) inquiry would not, standing alone, necessitate the reversal
of a conviction of a jointly represented defendant. However,
as is currently the case, a reviewing court is more likely to
assume a conflict resulted from the joint representation when
no inquiry or an inadequate inquiry was conducted. United
States v. Carrigan, supra; United States v. DeBerry, supra. On
the other hand, the mere fact that a rule 44(c) inquiry was
conducted in the early stages of the case does not relieve the
court of all responsibility in this regard thereafter. The
obligation placed upon the court by rule 44(c) is a continuing
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onef and thus in a particular case further inquiry may be
necessary on a later occasion because of new developments
suggesting a potential conflict of interest*
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